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USURY LAWS AND THE CORPORATE EXCEPTION
LAURENCE M. KATZ
INTRODUCTION
Along with the growth of usury laws has come the
so-called corporate exception, which relieves corporations
from the effect of the usury statutes. The effect of the
general law and its exception are diametrically opposed,
and their interrelationship leads to situations where the
furtherance of one undermines the other. The law's re-
actions to these conflicts has thus far been varied and
inconclusive. The need for a systematic study of this
problem is acute.
I. USURY
1. Background1 - From earliest times, the loan of
money for profit has been subject to control by society.'
In the Middle Ages this practice was considered in foro
conscientiae, the clergy believing that the charge of in-
terest in any form was against Divine law both natural
and revealed.3 Anyone found guilty of the practice was
subject to Church punishment,4 and if after death, it was
discovered that he had been a usurer, all of his chattels
were forfeited to the king and his land escheated to the
lord of the fee.5
In the "dark ages of monkish superstition and civil
tyranny, when interest was laid under a total interdict,
commerce was also at its lowest ebb."'  While money
during those times was conceived to be only a medium of
exchange,' it came to be recognized that it was of great
convenience in trading and commerce where credit was
I The term "usury" originally meant the loan of money for any amount of
interest.
2 
or an excellent discussion see Dunham v. 'Gould, 16 Johns 367, 376
et. seq. (N.Y. 1819).
8 2 BLAcxsToNE's COMMENTARIES (Lewis' ed. 1900) 454.
& PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956)
304.
6 10 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT (1852) 264 et. seq.
6 BLACKSTONE, 1c. cit. 8upra, n. 3.t Aristotle (Polit. L. 1. c. 10) has been attributed with saying that all
money is naturally barren and to make it breed money is a perversion
of its reason for existence which is to serve as a medium of exchange
and not of increase. Blackstone, however, suspects that Aristotle never
said this and that it was falsely attributed to him. BLACxSTONE, C. cit.
aupra, n. 3.
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a necessity. It was this realization, combined with a lay
reappraisal of the moral aspects of usury,' that led to a
series of English statutes9 which permitted the charge
of interest at controlled rates. These statutes, however,
bear witness to the Church's continued prejudice against
the practice of usury in any form. The statute 13 Eliz. c. 8
which permitted interest at ten percent stated "that all
usury being forbidden by the law of God is sin and
detestable." 21 Joc. 1 contained a provision that "nothing
in the law shall be construed to allow the practice of
usury in point of religion or conscience."'10
The American colonies passed usury statutes which
emulated those in force in England." Usurious contracts
under these acts were wholly void and criminal penalties12
OBLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra, n. 3, 455: "And, as to any scruples of con-
science, since all other conveniences of life may either be bought or
hired, but money can only be hired, there seems to be no greater oppres-
sion in taking a recompense or price for the hire of this, than of any
other convenience." However "to demand an exorbitant price is equally
contrary to conscience." Blackstone set out what he believed to be a
fair test for reasonable interest. It consisted of two parts - (1) A
reasonable rate for the temporary inconvenience of parting with the
money, and (2) A reasonable rate for the hazard of losing it entirely;
"[I]f the compensation allowed by law, does not exceed the proportion
of the hazard run, or the want felt, by the loan, its allowance is neither
repugnant to the revealed nor the natural law; but if it exceeds those
bounds, it is then oppressive usury." Grotius as quoted in BLAcxsToNE,
op. cit. supra, n. 3, 455; BAcoN, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 5. 'BAcoN argues that the
charge of a reasonable rate of interest is not against moral law, reasoning
that if it is not immoral for the borrower to profit from the use of the
money, it is equally moral for the lender to profit.
9 Usury was never illegal at common law. E.g., Plltt v. Kaufman, 188
Md. 606, 53 A. 2d 673 (1947) ; Fisher v. Bidwell, 27 Conn. 363, 372 (1858) ;
Spinney v. Winter Park 'Building and Loan Association, 120 Fla. 453, 162
So. 899 (1935).
" Apparently, this clause was inserted to satisfy the bishops who would
not pass the bill without it. BACON, lo. cit. aupra, n. 5.
"The statute 12 Anne c. 16, which was the prototype of all early state
statutes, read,
.... That no person ... upon.., any... contract which shall ... shall
. . . for loan of any monies, wares [etc.], above the value of five
pounds for the forbearance of one hundred pounds for a year ... and
that all bonds, contracts, and assurances . . . for payment of any
principal, or money to be lent... upon or for any usury, whereupon
or whereby shall be reserved or taken above the rate of five pounds
in the hundred . . . shall be utterly void; and that all and every
person ... which shall ... receive, by way or means of any corrupt
bargain, loan, exchange, chevizance, shift, or interest of any wares,
merchandize, or other thing or things whatsoever, or by any deceitful
way .. . for the forbearing or giving day of payment for one whole
year, of and for their money or other thing, above the sum of five
pounds for the forbearing of one hundred pounds for a year . . .
shall forfeit . . . the treble value of the monies, wares, merchandizes,
and other things so lent. .. ."
1Cf. 10 WEST'S ANNo CAL. CODES (1954) § 1916-3; 9 N.D. CENTURY
CODE ANNo. (1960) § 47-14-11. In these states usury is still considered a
misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.
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were inflicted upon the usurer who was unable to recover
interest or principal.13 Subsequent statutes have brought a
steady mitigation of these punishments. In Maryland, for
instance, prior to 1845, the proof of usury completely voided
the contract. By passage of a statute in that year,14 usurious
contracts could be enforced to the extent of the legal
interest." This is the rule in the majority of United States
jurisdictions today. 6
2. Rights Under Usurious Contracts - Basically statutes
regulate usury in this country, since its legality was never
considered by the common law. They provide for a maxi-
mum rate of interest varying from thirty to six percent.17
Since they were passed to protect the necessitous borrower
from the oppression of too much interest, 8 the borrower
91 C.J.S. 559, Usury, § 2.1 MD. LAWS 1845, ch. 352; 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 49, § 4.11 See, Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 126 A. 125, 127 (1924) ("Usury
would not vitiate the entire lan, but the party entitled to plead it would
simply be protected against the illegal excess.") See also, Scott v. Leary,
34 Md. 389, 398 (1871) and Gwyn v. Lee, 1 Md. Ch. 445 (1849).
91 C.J.S. 559, Usury, § 2.
'IA. 30% - 2 GEN. LAWS or R.I. (1956) § 6-26-2.
B. 12% - 8 N.M. Stat. 1953 (1962 Replacement) § 15-b-16; 10 CAL.
CODES ANxNO. (1954) § 1916-1; 17 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANNO. (1960) § 37.4;
2 REv. LAWS OF HAWAII (1955) T. 24, § 191-3; 2 NEv. ComP. LAWS (1929)§ 4323; REV. CODE OF WASH. ANNO. (1961) § 19.52.020.
C. 10% - 6A ARK. STAT. ANNO. (1947) (1957 Replacement) § 68-602;
19 FLA. 'STAT. ANNO. (1944) § 687.02 (Oorporation rate is 15%); GEN.
STAT. OF KAN. ANNO. (1949) § 16-202; 3 REv. CODE OF MONT. (1947)
(Reprint 1961) § 47-125; 1 OKL.A. STAT. (1951) tit. 15, § 266; ORM REV.
STAT. (1959 Supp.) § ORS 82.010; 15 TEx. STAT. ANNO. (1947) Art. 5071;
2 UTAH CODE ANNO. "(1953) § 15-1-2; 18 Wis. STAT. ANNo. (1957) § 115.04;
5 WYO. STAT. (1957) § 13-477.
D. 9% - 3A REv. STAT. OF NEB. of 1943 (1960) § 45-101.
E. 8% - 4 CODE OF AIA. (1958) tit. 9, § 60; 1 ALAKA COMP. LAWS
ANNO. (1949) § 25-1-1; 14 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANNO. (1956) § 44-1201; 2 D.C.
CODE (1951) § 28-2702; 5 IDAHO CODE (1948) § 27-1905; 12 LA. Civm Con
(1952) Art. 2924; 21 MINN. STAT. ANNO. (1947) § 334.01; 1 Miss. COnE
(1956) § 36; 21 ANNo. Mo. STAT. (1952) § 408.030; OHIO REV. CODE ANNo.
(1953) § 1309.01; 3 S.D. CODE OF 1939, § 38.0109.
F. 7% - ILL. ANNO. STAT. (1935) Ch. 74, § 4; 32 CODE OF IOWA (1950)§ 535.2; 14 MICH. STAT. ANNO. (1959) § 19.11; 9 N.D. CENTURY CODE ANNo.
(1960) § 47-14-09.
G. 66% -3 DEL. CODE ANNO. (1953) tit. 6, § 2301; Ky. REv. STAT. (1955)§ 360.010; 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 49, § 3; 3B ANNO. LAWS OF MASS. (1954)
Ch. 107, § 3; N.J. STAT. ANNO. (1940) § 31:1-1; 19 CoNsoL. LAWS OF N.Y.
ANNO. (1957) § 370; IC GEN. STAT. OF N.C. (1953) § 24-1; PA. 'STAT.
ANNo. (1954) tit. 41, § 3; 1 CODE OF LAWS OF S.C. (1952) § 8.3; 8 TENN.
CODE ANNO. (1955) § 47-1604; 2 VT. STAT. ANNO. (1958) tit. 9, § 31;
1 CODE OF VA. (1950) § 6-347; 2 W. VA. CODE OF 1961 ANNO., § 4628.
H. No maximum statute rates - Maine, New Hampshire, see also
4 COLO. REV. STAT. ANNO. (1953) § 73-1-3; where there is no statute or
a statute where no maximum rate is established, courts of equity have the
power to pass on the reasonableness of the rate of interest in a given
contract. Cate v. Merrill, 109 Me. 424, 84 A. 897, 898 (1912).
IFirst National Bank of Opp v. Cotton, 231 Ala. 288, 164 So. 371, 374
(1935).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
in a usurious transaction is not considered to be in pari
delicto with the lender,"9 his circumstances having forced
him to conclude the agreement. It is only the borrower or
those in privity with him who may avail themselves of
the defense.2" The lender may not use usury laws to his
advantage and attempt to avoid his part of the contract;
this would be an attempted utilization of his own immoral
acts.
II. THE CORPORATE EXCEPTION AND ITS EFFECTS
1. THE EXCEPTION
A. History - In England in the early Eighteenth Cen-
tury, an exception to the right of a borrower to plead the
defense of usury was created by statutory enactment.
The statute of 3 Geo. 1, c. 8, § 39 in 1716 was the first
statute passed which denied the defense of usury to a
corporate body.2 It was specifically addressed to the
Governor and Company of the Bank of England. It pro-
vided:
"That the said governor and company of the bank of
England. .. shall have power and authority, and they
are hereby enabled, in case they shall think fit,...
to borrow or take up money upon any contracts, bills,
bonds or obligations . . . at such rate or rates of in-
terest, or upon such terms as they shall think fit, al-
though the same shall happen to exceed the interest
allowed by law to be taken .... "22
In the United States, New York in 1850 passed the first
statute which denied the defense of usury to all corpora-
tions.23
At the present time nineteen states have statutes which
prohibit the defense of usury to corporations.24 Typical
Plitt v. Kaufman, 188 Md. 606, 612, 53 A. 2d 673 (1947).
21 Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S.W. 209 (1896) ; Hamil-
ton v. Prouty, 50 Wis. 592, 7 N.W. 659 (1880).
21ACON'S ABRIDGMENT, OP. Cit. 8upra, n. 5, 266.
2 By Geo. 1, c. 9, § 16 the same liberty was given to the South Sea
Company.
2119 M CKINNEY'S N.Y. LAWS (1957) § 374.
213 DEL. CODE ANNO. (1953) tit. 6, § 2304; SMiTH-HuRD ILL. ANNO.
STAT., Ch. 74, § 4; 5 IND. STAT. § 19-2001(c) ; GEN. STAT. OF KAN. (1949)
§ 17-4103; 'BALDWIN'S Ky. REV. STAT. ANNO. (1962 Cum. Issue) § 360.025;
2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 125; 15 MICH. STAT. ANNO. (1943) § 21.78;
21 MINN. STAT. ANNO. § 334.021; 21 VERNON'S ANNO. MO. STAT. § 408.060;
N.J. STAT. ANNO. § 31:1-6; 8 N.M. STAT. § 51-2-34; 19 MoKINNEY's N.Y.
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of such statutes is Maryland's which reads, "No corpora-
tions shall interpose the defense of usury in any action."25
B. Rationale for Corporate Exclusion - Two reasons
are advanced in favor of the corporate exception:
(i) Nature of usury statutes - The usury laws are
based upon the assumption of the inequality of the in-
dividual needy borrower and the lender. The corporation
it is said is not in need of the protection afforded to the
individual .2  It was organized for the purpose of con-
centrating in one undertaking the combined capital of
many individuals.
"It has no sensations and cannot be coerced by its
necessities into any legal obligations beyond its de-
fined and limited corporate powers * * *. The in-
dividual borrows from a need springing from his own
personal necessities, but the corporation becomes a
borrower from a corporate exigency. * * * [T]he loss
of the individual, singly or jointly, through usury, is
at once both personal and immediate, but that of a
corporation may or may not result in ultimate loss to
its fluctuating membership, and therefore, while the
corporate loss is immediate to the corporation, it is
both mediate and proportional among the corporate
membership. 27
(ii) The desirability of advancing commerce - The
usury laws, by placing a ceiling on the interest that may be
charged, act as restraints "on the natural flow and supply
of capital to the prejudice of industry and commerce. '2s
By releasing the corporation, which is the prime vehicle of
industry and commerce, from this restraint lenders are
more willing to risk their capital on corporate ventures and
commerce is increased.
2 9
LAws (1957) § 374; 1C GEN. STAT. OF N.C. § 24-8; Oir.A. STAT., tit. 18,
§ 1.26; 15 PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANNo. § 2852-313; 1 CODE OF LAWS or S.C.,
tit. 8, § 8; VA. CODE (1950) § 6-351; 2 W. VA. CODE ANNO. (1961) § 4632;
18 Wis. STAT. ANNO., § 115.06. Unless usury laws are by their terms
limited to exclude corporations, corporations are treated in the same
manner as other borrowers. Commissioners v. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 77
N.C. 289 (1877).
22 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 125.
Southern Life Insurance and Trust Company v. Packer and Prentice,
17 N.Y. 51, 53 (1858).
21 Carozza v. Federal Finance Co., 149 Md. 223, 249, 250, 131 A. 332(1925).
2 Ibid.
11 Matlack Properties v. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank, 120 Fla. 77,
162 So. 148, 150 (1935); Fine v. H. Klein, Inc., 10 N.J. Super. 295, 77
A. 2d 295, 296 (1950).
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C. Liberal Interpretation of the Corporate Exception -
Exception statutes have been interpreted liberally on the
ground that they restore the common law.0 When sued on
a note that would otherwise be usurious, borrowing corpo-
rations have argued that a literal reading of statutes which
provide that, "No corporation shall interpose the defense
of usury . . ,"' would only prohibit corporations from
using the usury defense in the pleadings. Such a proposed
reading has been unanimously denied, and the protection
of the usury laws have been denied to the corporations in
all stages of litigation. 2
30 Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9 (1857) ; Alston v. American Mortgage Co.,
116 Ohio St. 643, 157 N.E. 374 (1927).
Originally, there was some question as to the constitutionality of these
statutes; however, it is now well settled that they are not in violation of
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. E.g., Carozza
v. Federal Finance & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925) ; Penrose
v. Canton Nat. Bank, 147 Md. 200, 127 A. 852 (1925); Brierley v. Com-
mercial Credit Co., 43 F. 2d 724 (D.C. Pa. 1929) aft'd, 43 F. 2d 730
(3rd Cir. 1930). In Danville v. Pace, 66 Va. 1 (1874) the court gives two
reasons for upholding the constitutionality of the statute: (1) Rather
than impairing the obligation of the contract the statute lends it validity.
(2) The defense of usury was not available at common law; therefore,
since the usury statutes are strictly penal in nature, the legislature had
the power to take the defense away at any time.
Another early problem was whether the statutes were retrospective in
effect and apply to obligations entered, into by the corporation prior to
their enactment. A number of courts decided the question in favor of
the lender. In Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 229 (1857) the court stated
that the statute repealing the usury law as it is applied to corporations
"obliterates the statute repealed, as completely as if it had not been
passed, and it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for
the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and con-
cluded while it was an existing law;" Southern Life Ins. & T. Co. v.
Packer, 17 N.Y. 51 (1858). The reasoning has been either that the cause
of action first accrued to the borrower when the loan became due and
that the statute in effect at that time should govern, Horey v. Wark-Gilbert
Co., 248 Mich. 502, 227 N.W. 543 (1929), or that the intent of the statute
is that it should be all-embracing as shown by the absence of savings
clauses which were present in a prior English statute. In Curtis v.
Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 228, 229 (1857) the court stated that:
"The statute was intended to embrace, in the prohibition, the setting
up as a defense usurious agreements, made as well before as after
the passage of the act. The intent is evident from the omission to
insert in the act a saving clause in favor of existing rights and
remedies of persons having a right to set up the defense of usury,
as was done in the act of 17 and 18 Victoria ch. 90, repealing the
English statutes of usury."
However when the corporate exception itself has been repealed an opposite
conclusion has resulted. Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956);
Sohmer Factors Corp. v. The 278 Corp., 172 N.Y.S. 2d 886 (1958). The
reason for this distinction may be explained on the grounds that since
the usury laws are in derogation of the common law, they should be
construed strictly; whereas the corporate exception is restorative of the
common law and as such should be given full effect.
mE.g., 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 125; 19 MoKINNEY's N.Y. LAWS
(1957) § 374.
81E.g., Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A.
332 (1925); Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956) ; Helos v. State
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Corporations also met defeat when they tried to cir-
cumvent the exception statutes by bringing affirmative
actions against the lender.3 They filed bills in equity to
cancel corporate obligations, 4 or to recover usurious pre-
miums already paid,35 and brought suits in trover for
property or securities deposited as collateral. 6 These ac-
tions failed because "such a construction would defeat all
the beneficial aims of the act, and usury would only cease
to be a shield, to become the more obnoxious as a sword."87
The overall application of the exception statute to the
corporation is now undisputed. 8
2. EFFECT OF THE ExcEPTIoN ON THOSE IN SPECIAL RELA-
TION TO THE CoRPoRATIoN-Although the exception statutes
only mention "corporations," those in special relationships to
a corporation will also come under their egis when because
of their position the courts hold them to the statute so
that the lender will not be forced to accept an interest rate
lower than the one to which they had agreed. Therefore,
it is said that the defense of usury is denied to all persons
in privity with the borrowing corporation .3  This test of
privity had led to the judicial recognition of several groups
that along with the corporation are affected by the excep-
tion statutes.
A. Receivers and Trustees in Bankruptcy - Receivers40
and trustees4 in bankruptcy have been denied the privilege
of employing the usury statutes on obligations incurred by
the corporation when such corporations could not them-
Land Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 239, 166 A. 330 (1933) ; Rosa v. Butterfleld, 33 N.Y.
665 (1865).
13 Pink Lady Inc. v. William Penn Loan Co., 189 Pa. Super. 187, 150 A.
2d 154, 155 (1959).
" Shriver v. Druid Realty Co., 149 Md. 385, 131 A. 815 (1926) ; Holland
v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956) ; Isle of Wight Co. v. Smith, 51 Hun.
562, 4 N.Y.S. 73 (1889); Pink Lady Inc. v. William Penn Loan Co., 189
Pa. Super. 187, 150 A. 2d 154 (1959).
Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F. 2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929).Rosa v. Butterfield, 33 N.Y. 665 (1865).8 Id., 668.
"As to the corporations themselves, many courts in denying the defense
of usury to them have merely quoted the corporate exception statutes.
E.g., Product Sales Co. v. Guaranty Co., 146 Md. 678, 680, 127 A. 409
(1925) ("such a defense (usury) would not be maintainable under the
laws of this State, since the defendant is a corporation") ; Shriver v.
Druid Realty Co., 149 Md. 385, 131 A. 815 (1926); Kinsey v. Drury, 146
Md. 227, 126 A. 125 (1924).
'Winkle v. Scott, 99 F. 2d 299 (8th Cir. 1938).
10 Felin v. Arrow Mach. Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 44, 124 A. 448 (1924) ; Curtis
v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9 (1857) ; Houghten v. Restland Memorial Park, 343 Pa.
625, 23 A. 2d 497 (1942).
"In Re Kashmire Refinishing Co., 94 F. 2d 652 (2d Cir. 1938) ; In Re
Bernard and Katz, 38 F. 2d 40 (2d Cir. 1930).
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selves have used this defense. This fits the privity test and
seems to be sound reasoning since receivers and trustees
have "no greater or different rights than those that might
have been asserted by the companies"42 and act in a repre-
sentative capacity.43 However, where the receiver, after
appointment, enters into an obligation, it is said that he
does so as agent of the court and not of the corporation;
consequently the defense of usury is available to him.44
B. Assuming Vendee - One who purchases property
mortgaged by a corporation (at what would normally be a
usurious charge) and assumes the mortgage is barred from
access to the usury statute.45 While he does not clearly
meet the privity test, the result is reasonable since it
protects the mortgagee from being forced to accept an
interest payment lower than the one agreed to between
himself and the corporation. If the person assuming the
mortgage would be permitted to plead the usury laws,
it would then seem possible for a corporate mortgagor to
sell the property to a "straw man" who would then plead
the usury law. If the corporation were liquidated after
the sale, this would defeat the exception statute's object of
permitting uncontrolled charges of interest to corporate
borrowers.
C. Minority Stockholders - These persons are simi-
larly barred from questioning corporate obligations since
they are in fact a part of the borrowing corporation.48
D. Collaterally Liable Persons - The courts, by fur-
ther liberal construction of the statutes, include within
their bounds indorsers, guarantors and sureties of corporate
obligations, although these results have not been accom-
plished without difficulty.
A number of the earlier cases permitted collaterally
liable persons to plead the usury statutes notwithstanding
the fact that the principal party was prohibited. The two
basic reasons for this view are illustrated in Hungerford's
"Merchants' & Manufacturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson, 69 F. 2d 940,
945 (8th Cir. 1934).
"Rosa v. Butterfield, 33 N.Y. 665, 668 (1865) ("By the letter of the act
corporations alone are forbidden to interpose the defense. But the assignees
or representatives of a corporation should be regarded as within fts
spirit .. ")
"In Re West Counties Const. Co., 182 F. 2d 729 (7th Cir. 1950).
"Miller v. Reid, 243 Mich. 694, 220 N.W. 748 (1928) ; Liebers v. Plainfield
Spanish Homes Bldg. Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 391, 155 A. 270, 271 (1931).
"MacQuoid v. Queens Estates, 143 App. Div. 134, 127 N.Y.S. 867
(1911).
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Bank v. Dodge47 and Market Bank of Troy v. Smith.4 In
the former case, the court based its decision on the theory
that the contracts of the principal and guarantor are en-
tirely distinct, in that one is absolute while the other is
conditional and that they, therefore, should be governed
by different rules. The latter case held that the statute was
only meant to affect the corporation's obligation, withdraw-
ing from the corporation the protection of the usury laws,
but not intended to validate the contracts themselves.
As the courts broadened their interpretation of the ex-
ception statutes and recognized that collaterally liable per-
sons do come under their purview, 9 the initial thought
that the statute acted directly upon the corporation and
only "indirectly and incidentally upon the contract,"50 was
reversed so that it is now held that the contract itself is
affected, and that the usury laws are completely repealed
as they apply to corporations and their obligations. The
contract being lawful,51 collaterally liable persons are held
to the literal purport of their obligations, "for they are said
to assume the full contract made by the corporation. '5 2
Undoubtedly, practical considerations were of primary
importance in reaching this conclusion.53 The basic purpose
for the passage of the exception statutes was the desire to
aid in the development of resources by allowing high rates
of interest to attract capital to new ventures. If a loan to
a corporation involved a high amount of risk, then the
lender would try to secure himself by requiring a surety or
guarantor. So, if the collaterally liable person were per-
mitted to plead the usury law in defense to a suit on the
loan, the lender would be deterred from making the loan,
"and the social end to which the corporate exclusion is
directed [would be] defeated. ' '54
"730 Barb (N.Y.) 626 (1860).
"8 F. Cas. No. 9090 (D.C. Wis. 1858).
In Penrose v. Canton Nat. Bank, 147 Md. 200, 207, 127 A. 852 (1925)
the court said, ". . . even an accommodation indorser, as well as the
corporate maker, has been held barred from making this [usury] a de-
fense." See also Carozza v. Federal Finance Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332
(1925) ; Winkle v. Scott, 99 F. 2d 299 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Pardee v. Fetter,
345 Mich. 548, 77 N.W. 2d 124 (1956) ; Feller v. Architects Display Bldgs.,
Inc., 54 N.J. Super. 205, 148 A. 2d 634 (1959) ; Hungerford's Bank v. Dodge,
supra, n. 47, 629.
0Hungerford's Bank v. Dodge, supra, n. 47, 629.
Winkle v. Scott, 99 F. 2d 299 (8th Cir. 1938).
Note, Defense of Usury Denied Accommodation Indorser of Corporate
Note, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 602 (1957) ; Stewart v. Bramhall, 74 N.Y. 85
(1878).
Rosa v. Butterfield, 33 N.Y. 665, 674 (1865).
Note, Defense of Usury Denied Accommodation Indorser of Corporate
Note, op. cit. supra, n. 51, 603.
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However, in giving full effect to the exception statutes,
the underlying reasons for the usury laws and those for
the corporate exception statutes may come into conflict.
At the present time there is no exception statute which
specifically addresses itself to the small corporations.
Therefore, where the owners of small corporations have
personally guaranteed their corporations' obligations, these
persons have not been successful in avoiding the applica-
tion of the exception statutes by alleging that their obli-
gations were primary rather than collateral, i.e., that the
loans, though in form made to the corporations, were in
truth made to them. In the recent case of Dahmes v. In-
dustrial Credit Company," where the "GUARANTY"
agreement, signed by the owner of a small corporation,
read, "'The undersigned agree: * * * that their liability
hereunder is direct and unconditional and may be enforced
without requiring LENDER first to resort to any other
right, remedy or security; * * .,,,6 the Minnesota Court
said:
"The rationale of the rule precluding guarantors from
asserting the defense of usury, when it is not avail-
able to the principal debtor, relates to the character
of the obligation rather than the means of enforcing
it, and applies with equal force to both types of
guarantees. The true and correct issue and question
involved is whether the plaintiffs' promise is an origi-
nal undertaking or a collateral one. Although the
defendant [lender] here could proceed directly against
the plaintiffs [surety], the plaintiffs' liability was,
nevertheless, dependent upon the failure of the corpo-
ration to perform and hence was a collateral under-
taking in which the defense of usury, not being avail-
able to the principal obligor, was similarly not avail-
able to the plaintiffs."57
The dissenting opinion, however, questioned the propriety
of the effect of such a decision on owners of small corpora-
tions:
"As the majority now construe [the corporate excep-
tion statute] in conjunction with [the general usury
statute], the aftermath can only be the end of statutory
protection against usury for individual owners of small
corporate business enterprises in Minnesota. There-
110 N.W. 2d 484 (Minn. 1961).
Id., 487.
I d., 489.
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under it is a certainty that in most cases only to such
corporate enterprises will business loans be made.
That such loans will bear interest in excess of 8 percent
per annum is likewise quite certain. The process by
which such higher rates can be safely attained will
no longer be complex or hazardous under the decision
here. When an individual business owner is compelled
by economic conditions or otherwise to seek financing,
it will be then revealed to him by prospective lenders
that only corporate loans at excessive rates of interest
are considered; that such loans must be secured by all
corporate assets and, in addition, by pledge of such
individual's assets otherwise exempt and protected
against usury; and that direct and primary liability
therefor must be assumed by the individual owner.
"Quite often, as in the instant case, the inevitable
result is the financial doom of both the corporation
and the individual, preceded, of course, by a vain and
valiant effort to pay off an extortionate debt, seldom
resulting in more than payment of the excessive in-
terest thereon. A default therein, of course, is usually
followed by prompt foreclosure of all corporate and
individual assets and often, as here, by claims for de-
ficiency judgments against the individual owner for
any unpaid balance on the corporate debt after the
various foreclosure sales."5
E. Promoters of the Corporation - Where a corpora-
tion is founded with a view towards solving the usury
problem, the conflict between the usury laws and the
exception statute is particularly acute. A common situa-
tion is where an individual borrower does not receive a
loan because the interest rate permitted under the usury
law is too low. The lender suggests that if the borrower
incorporates, a loan can be arranged at an agreed rate of
interest. A corporation is then formed and the borrower
transfers property to secure the loan, which is then con-
cluded at a rate of interest in excess of the amount which
would have been originally permitted by the usury laws.
To this loan the individual acts as a guarantor. The ques-
tion is who is really the borrower - the corporation or
the individual?
The courts were at first reluctant to permit this cir-
cumvention of the usury laws. Typical of these older
-Id., 493.
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cases is First National Bank v. American Near East and
Black Seas Lines where the New York Supreme Court
held:
"The answer alleges that it was agreed between
Samuel Clark Williams [lender] and the defendants
that the corporation appear as maker and the indi-
vidual defendants as indorsers; that in fact no money
was loaned to the corporation, but the loan was to the
individual defendants; and that it was all pursuant
to a plan to evade the usury statute, because the
maker, being a corporation, would be unable, by rea-
son of the statute, to avail itself of the defense of
usury. * * * The law is that, if there is notice of an
intent to take usury, the lender cannot evade the
statute by disguising the borrower."5 9
This judicial trend, however, was reversed by Jenkins v.
Moyse, 0 decided by the New York Court of Appeals in
1930. The Court sanctioned a similar arrangement and
held that the usury laws were not evaded but had been
"followed meticulously in order to accomplish a result
which all parties desire and which the law does not for-
bid .... -61 The Court continued:
"Corporations are, ordinarily, created because through
the corporate form some advantage is obtained which
would be denied to an individual or a group of indi-
viduals. That has been done here, and no ground has
been shown for disregarding the corporate entity,
though that entity has been formed for the purpose
of doing something permitted to a corporation but
forbidden to an individual."62
A vital, but unconvincing, distinction has been drawn
by the later cases considering this situation. If, as in the
Jenkins case and Rabinowich v. Eliasberg,63 a Maryland
case relying on the Jenkins case, the lender absolutely
refuses to make the loan to the individual, the loan will
be considered the corporation's; but if the lender agrees
to make the loan to the individual if he incorporates, then
the loan will be considered the individual's obligation.6 4
119 Misc. 650, 197 N.Y.S. 856 (1922).
254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
Id., 522.
6 Supra, n. 59, 522.
159 Md. 655, 152 A. 437 (1930).
"In Re Greenberg, 21 NJ. 213, 121 A. 2d 520, 524 (1956) where the
creditor explained that he intended to make a loan to "these people" and
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The tenuous nature of this distinction can be seen in
Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern,65 where the borrower testified
that "They [the lenders] were willing to give me the
loan if I would go and incorporate" and the lender testi-
fied that he told the borrower, "We do not make loans to
individuals," and in answer to the borrower's question,
"As a corporation, would you consider the loan?" he simply
answered, "Yes," 66 the Court said:
"Plainly, these conflicting proofs presented a jury
question whether the loans were made to Kugel indi-
vidually and whether the corporation was created at
the insistence of the plaintiffs to serve as a cloak to
cover usurious transactions to evade the usury stat-
ute."6 " [Emphasis added.]
A knowledgeable lender can, therefore, take advantage
of this hairline distinction by first absolutely refusing to
make the loan to the individual but then suggesting that a
corporation be formed and the loan be made to it. The
effect is that the lender can always approach the trans-
action so as to bring the loan within the rule of the Jenkins
and Rabinowich cases, thereby avoiding the consequences
of an otherwise usurious contract.
Proof of the popularity of this scheme is evidenced by
an amendment to the New York corporate exception stat-
ute"9 enacted in 1955 to alleviate a situation whereby cer-
tain money lenders, using the above formula, had been
making short term loans to homeowners requiring interest
he suggested that "they have a corporation and they were agreeable to the
same," the court said, "[Tlhe transaction . . . was in reality a loan to
individuals and that the corporate device was invoked at the lender's
insistence to circumvent or evade the State's policy against usurious
transactions." See also, Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co., 145 Misc.
734, 260 N.Y.S. 229 (1932).
110 N.J. 191, 89 A. 2d 654 (1952).
-Id., 657.
Supra, n. 64, 657.
61 Comment, Usury Inc. - Incorporation to Avoid Usury Laws, 7 Miami
Law Quarterly 375 (1953).
619 MoKiNNEY's N.Y. LAws (1957) § 374(2).
"The provisions of subdivision one of this section [the corporate
exception statute] shall not apply to a corporation, the principal asset
of which shall be the ownership of a one or two family dwelling,
where it appears either 'that the said corporation was organized and
created, or that the controlling interest therein was acquired, within
a period of six months prior to the execution, by said corporation of
a bond or note evidencing indebtedness, and a mortgage creating a
lien for said indebtedness on the said one or two family dwelling.
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reportedly as high as 65 percent.70  The lenders had, by
using this device, successfully evaded the entire spirit
of the usury laws.7 The amendment allows the defense
of usury to a corporation whose principal asset is the
ownership of a one or two family dwelling where it ap-
pears that the corporation was organized within a period
of six months prior to the corporation's execution of a
mortgage on the one or two family dwelling.72
3. CO-OBLIGORS - An individual joint primary obligor
may defend on the grounds of usury even though the de-
fense is denied to a co-obligor because of its corporate
character.7  This is based upon the proposition that a
joint primary obligor enters into an independent contract
in which he has a beneficial interest. His right to a usury
defense is not derived from the other obligors, as is true of
collaterally liable persons, but is his in his own right.74
It has been said, however, that if he has no beneficial in-
terest, i.e., he is an accommodation maker who signs along
70 Comment, The Corporate Device as a Cover for Usury-Amendment
to New York GeneraZ Business Law, Section 374-Corporations Prohibited
From Interposing the Defense of Usury, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 715, 721
(1956).
"Declaration of policy to 19 McKirqNY's N.Y. LAws (1957) § 874.
"The people of this state have a vital interest in encouraging its
citizens to establish and maintain one and two-family homeowning
communities, and in preventing the imposition of oppressive and un-
ethical economic burdens upon the members of such communities. It
is hereby declared that unfair, unjust, destructive, demoralizing and
uneconomic practices have been and are now being carried on by
money lenders using the corporate device to accomplish the exaction of
oppressive and usurious rates of interest or other compensation for
loans secured by mortgages upon such homes.
"To protect the well-being of our citizens, to protect the public
welfare, to prevent the loss of such houses by the members of such
communities through the foreclosure of mortgages securing such op-
pressive, unreasonable and usurious loans, to prevent the owners of
such homes from becoming a burden upon the community and in
furtherance of the public policy of this state that such homeowners
be encouraged to establish and maintain one and two-family home-
owning communities, the following provisions (section 374 as amended)
are enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state."
In discussing this amendment, the court in Sohmer Factors Corp. v. 187-20
Tioga Drive Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 862, 169 N.Y.S. 2d 557, 560 (1957) said,
"Prior to the recent amendments money lenders must have realized
that these usurious transactions violated', if not the letter, at least
the spirit of legislation declaring an important social policy of the
state. If they had discovered a loophole by which they could nullify
that policy, they should have anticipated that corrective legislation
would eventually be enacted to prevent such frustration."
72A similar provision is to be found in BAT WIN's Ky. REV. STAT.
(1962) § 360.025.
3Astra Pictures, Inc. v. Shapiro, 182 Misc. 19, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 858 (1944);
Schwartz v. Fifty Greenwich Street Realty Corp., 265 N.Y. 443, 193 N.E.
263 (1934).
71Pink v. L. Kaplan, Inc., 252 App. Div. 490, 300 N.Y.S. 45 (1937).
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with a corporate obligor, the defense will be denied to him,
"because it would have to come through a corporate maker,
by whom it is not possessed."7 5 This conclusion appears
inconsistent with the Negotiable Instruments Law under
which it was decided, and the Uniform Commercial Code
which generally fix the rights and obligations of parties to
notes viz a viz payees and holders, according to the man-
mer in which they signed the instrument and not upon
private agreements among themselves.76 However, while
there may be inconsistency in the reasoning, the result is
in harmony with the court's apparent goal of giving full
effect to the corporate exception.
III. CONCLUSION
We have seen that the courts, desiring to give full
effect to the corporate exclusion statutes, so that commerce
may prosper, continuously interpreted them liberally. In-
sofar as their interpretation affects large corporations, it
accomplishes all of the advantages attributed to the ex-
clusion statutes and has minimal undermining effect on
the general usury laws.
This is not the effect of the court's liberal interpreta-
tion, however, when a small corporation is involved.
There, transactions may not be divorced from the indi-
viduals behind them as they are in large corporations.
There, the corporation often is merely the alter ego of a
single individual or a fiction drawn up to subvert the usury
law. In the former case, the corporation may be driven
by necessity, and coerced into unfair contracts as easily
as individuals. In the latter case the entire force of the
usury law is lost. Lenders almost invariably require that
the owners act as sureties or guarantors to their obliga-
tions. On the other hand, it is often they, rather than the
large corporations, which are in need of greater facility to
the money market.
The courts, as has been shown, have deemed it neces-
sary to prohibit the defense of usury to guarantors and
sureties in order to give full effect to the corporate ex-
clusion and encourage loans by lenders who otherwise
would not risk their capital without the benefit of sureties
and guarantors. If this is so, then is it not true that the
lenders are ultimately relying on these individuals and
not on the corporations and their assets to fulfill the obli-
"Rockmore v. Epstein, 127 Misc. 526, 217 N.Y.S. 76, 79 (1926).
"BnrroN, BiLLs AwD NoTEs (2d ed. 1961) § 42; Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, § 60; Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-413.
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gations? Why then should these individuals, who are often
the sole owners of the corporate obligors, be subject to a
rate of interest not required of other individuals and
which the usury laws have, in regard to other individuals,
declared immoral?
Giving lenders a free hand in dealing with every corpo-
ration is not the answer. What appears to be a great
injustice is the law's unwillingness or inability, under the
corporate exception statutes, to look to the circumstances
of each case to modify obviously unjust interest rates. The
exception statutes do not pre-empt judicial discretion.
For instance, a court's determination that one is primarily
or secondarily liable will control the application of the
statute. Conceivably, the courts could, by considering re-
lated legal principles, increase their role in determining
the equity of applying the corporate exception to those in
a special relationship to the corporation on an ad hoc,
case by case basis. Though this is a possible approach to
the solution of the problem, it has a number of obvious
dangers and disadvantages. The law in these areas would
be "stretched" in order to effect equitable solutions to in-
dividual cases and any changes would be sporadic, slow in
development and unpredictable.
In an attempt to solve this problem by legislation, the
State of Florida in 1955 enacted a statute which sets a
separate maximum interest rate for individual and corpo-
rate obligors - ten percent for individuals and fifteen
percent for corporations. 77 The 1955 amendment to the
New York statute exempts from the corporate exception
statute, corporations formed by homeowners where the
sole assets of these corporations is the ownership of a
one or two-family dwelling and where such dwelling was
mortgaged in orderto obtain a loan. Though it attempts
to solve one important problem, it does not examine the
area as a whole and for this reason does not appear as
satisfactory as the Florida legislation which does propose a
comprehensive solution.
Changes which clearly should come about in this field
must be brought by increased jurisdiction of the courts or
by statutory enactment. In the interest of speed, clarity
and predictability, the latter approach is suggested for
new answers to this vexing problem.
'719 FLA. STAT. ANwO. (1944) § 687.03.
